Kissinger: War Criminal, A$$hole or Great Diplomat?

Thoughts and summary of Walter Isaacson's 1992 biography of Henry Kissinger

Within 5 minutes of picking up Kissinger’s biography, I already had somebody screaming at me.

They called Kissinger a War Criminal and an a$$hole. I was surprised by this. I’ve seen people read biographies of Hitler, Stalin, Mao and other murderous figures in public without inciting such a reaction. Just wanting to learn more about Kissinger, angered this person deeply. Naturally, this gave me additional motivation to plow through the proceeding 750 page Walter Isaacson biography. 

Besides being the first foreign born and Jewish Secretary of State, he stands out from the others who served in that role because of the uncommonly large public profile and attention he commanded. When he was not flying around the world meeting with political leaders, he was being photographed with Hollywood starlets, fashion designers and other prominent celebrities. Kissinger received a disproportionate amount of credit, positive and negative, for foreign policy decisions compared to President Nixon, whom he served under. 

When Nixon and Kissinger assumed office in 1969, the United States was involved in a Cold War with the Soviet Union, a military conflict with the Vietnam War and indirect hostilities with China. Kissinger took the leading role navigating these conflicts and others while wielding unprecedented leeway for a National Security Advisor. The way he handled these situations has divided contemporaries and historians alike. His proponents will say he handled many of these situations well and was among the most effective Secretary of States of the 20th century. His critics will contend Kissinger was responsible for Millions of unnecessary deaths and made lasting damage to America’s diplomatic relations, still haunting them today.

There are countless academic papers and articles that will argue either side of that spectrum, I am not interested in contributing another. What follows is a summary of my thoughts on the book and my attempt to answer why I believe Kissinger draws such a visceral reaction. Said differently, is Kissinger in fact a War Criminal and/or an A$$hole or was he a very effective Secretary of State?

Pre-White House Years (1923-1969)

Before notoriety, Henry Alfred Kissinger was a German Jewish Refugee who fled Nazi Germany for New York in 1938. He would find himself back in Germany a few years later, as a member of the US Military. His ability to speak German proved to be very useful and he drew the attention of his first mentor, Fritz Kraemer. Isaacson highlights this relationship as one of the many he was able to form, which contributed to his meteoric rise. There were few German speakers in the US army so he quickly found himself assigned to Counter-Intelligence.

In Counter-Intelligence, he was tasked with restoring order in captured German towns, ferreting out Nazis and Gestapo members. This was a job that Kissinger excelled at but he did not savor the revenge. Despite what the Nazis had done to his family, he was not vindictive and rapidly lost his desire to personally pick off people one by one. Using other methods, he remained effective, likely capturing more Gestapo than the rest of the Army combined. Kissinger received significant praise for not abusing his new found power and authority. He worked well with the local German population, using diplomatic efforts to Denazify these towns. This demonstrated his early abilities and instincts that would help him later in life. 

(Private Henry Kissinger was assigned to Company G 335th Infantry Regiment of the 84th Infantry Division at Camp Claiborne, La. (Robertson Collection)

(so far does not seem like a war criminal or a$$hole)

Upon his return to the US after WWII, Kissinger would enroll at Harvard. Studying history and political science, he distinguished himself amongst his peers for his intense work ethic, intellect and erratic temperament, all qualities that he would be known for his entire life. He paid particular attention to Bismark, Castlereagh and Metternich; which would later serve as the basis for his view of international relations known as Realpolitik. 

Realpolitik is a pragmatic approach to diplomacy that prioritizes practical considerations, such as national interests, power dynamics, and geopolitical realities, over moral principles.

If you subscribe to realpolitik, you believe that states are motivated primarily by their own interests and seek to maximize their power. This can lead to rapidly shifting allegiances and even working with states with conflicting ideologies. Kissinger’s particular brand of realpolitik, focused on maintaining power to preserve stability and deterring aggression. Isaacson and others, will link Kissinger’s embrace of power and stability to his experience growing up in Nazi Germany as a persecuted religious minority¹. 

Harvard also helped Kissinger network with powerful people. He took on the responsibility of organizing the Harvard Summer Seminar and was soon convincing notable international figures to come and lecture at Harvard. This demonstrated his early abilities to broker relationships. He joined Harvard’s faculty in 1954, teaching International Relations and Government. During his time at Harvard, he gained the reputation as an expert on foreign affairs, his writings on Nuclear Weapons and its role in foreign policy was widely read, including by President Eisenhower, who’s policies he criticized. This helped further establish his credibility and eventually connected him with next mentor and patron in Nelson Rockefeller. Kissinger would develop a close relationship and work for Rockefeller as a consultant in his Presidential runs throughout the sixties.

(Kissinger & Rockefeller in 1975)

It was following Rockefeller’s final unsuccessful bid in 1968, where Kissinger would start working with Richard Nixon. In true realpolitik fashion, Kissinger’s desire to join Nixon’s campaign came shortly after calling Nixon the most dangerous of all men running for President and solemnly swearing not to work for a campaign other than Rockefeller’s. This abrupt pivot contributed to his reputation of being somebody willing to abandon prior loyalties or sacrifice his morals in exchange for power. This move to the Nixon campaign, would land him in the White House as a National Security Advisor in 1969. 

No evidence or charges of being a war criminal or asshole yet. Definitely an opportunist but his 30 year rise from refugee to the White House is nothing short of remarkable.

Nixon White House Years (1969-1974):

Kissinger would be linked with Nixon for the rest of his life. Prior to joining the White House, Kissinger was not a household name. Despite his best seller, and association with Rockefeller, he was still largely an academic, not known to the average person. Only 30 years removed from fleeing Nazi Germany, Kissinger suddenly assumed one of the most important roles within the administration, as Nixon’s go-to person for anything related to foreign policy. Richard “Tricky Dicky” (not an official nickname) Nixon had an erratic personality, which played into Kissinger’s worst instincts. Kissinger had a strong desire for power and a crippling desire to be liked by all. This helped fuel his rapid ascension but also meant he would quickly sell himself out to achieve this status. This is why he would tolerate all kinds of abuse from the President. Nixon would regularly make anti-semetic remarks, to his face. Similarly, to curry favor, he would regularly entertain some of Nixon’s crazier notions, that he knew to be dangerous or irresponsible. 

This posterior polishing ultimately did benefit Kissinger as Nixon would allow him unprecedented control and authority as a National Security Advisor, at times carrying out orders without the consultation of the State Department or key members of the Pentagon. This secretive diplomacy had its benefits and drawbacks. It enhanced Kissinger’s image, feeding his considerable ego while giving him more authority and ability to move faster. On the other hand, cutting out other departments and holding secret talks, meant he was sometimes operating on incomplete information, he could be easily accused of saying or doing things he did not. Furthermore, when things went awry, the blame would largely fall on him.   

This approach made him many enemies inside and outside the White House, making his job more difficult than it needed to be. Nixon was largely suspicious and jealous of Kissinger, fearing that Kissinger’s status was surpassing the President’s. His concerns were not completely unfounded, as Kissinger paid considerable attention to his public image. Throughout his time in office, he would regularly ensure that he would get photographed out in public with the hot starlet of the day. This would contribute to the certain mystic he was crafting; people would understandably be curious how a short, overweight and not particularly handsome man as himself could maintain such a dating streak. To which he would respond:

“Power is the ultimate aphrodisiac”

(Kissinger and actress Marlo Thomas attend a USC party in Hollywood, in honor of deceased lyricist Oscar Hammerstein, circa 1970)

Dating Hollywood starlets can only keep somebody relevant for so long, otherwise Isaacson would have started a biography on Pete Davison by now. While this was certainly an added bonus, the main reason Kissinger got the attention he did, was because of his performance as a Diplomatic². He was involved in many international affairs but for the purpose of this post, I am only going to focus on his role related to the USSR, China, the Vietnam War & Cambodia & the Yom Kippur War.

Dating Hollywood starlets is not a war crime. One could accuse him of using these women, which would have him dip into asshole territory. His ability to amass such a dating history despite his physical limitations does bode well for his reputation as a diplomat.   

USSR

Prior to the start of the Nixon administration in 1969, U.S.-Soviet relations were characterized by a mixture of confrontation and competition, framed by the broader context of the Cold War. There was a fierce space race, a perilous nuclear arms race, escalating tensions with a number of proxy wars and the potential for direct conflict. Despite these challenges, there were emerging indications of interest from both sides in exploring measures to stabilize their relationship and reduce the risk of nuclear war, setting the stage for détente.

Détente (French for Relaxation), was the policy aimed at reducing the potential for military conflict and nuclear warfare between the two superpowers. 

Kissinger was one of the main forces behind Détente, believing that deescalating with the Soviets would lead to increased global stability, which would be largely beneficial for the US. Not everybody was in favor of this. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Pentagon preferred a more Hawkish line instead of Kissinger’s diplomatic dealings. Kissinger believed the best way to manage the relationship with the Soviets was to associate the many issues together instead of segregating each individually. What he called Linkage. For him, he believed that he could use Nuclear disarmament talks to pressure the Soviets into helping the US negotiate a preferential conclusion to the War in Vietnam. Despite his insistence, Linkage did not appear to work. Nonetheless, Kissinger would still manage to achieve major breakthroughs with the USSR on Disarmament, with the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I accords signed in 1972. This represented one of the most monumental achievements of the Nixon administration. The SALT I accords among other things limited the number of anti-ballistic complexes and put limits on the number of missiles and military arsenal. This was the first major de-escalation agreement between the US and USSR since the Cold War began. 

Despite the accomplishment, Kissinger would get criticized for his role in the talks and some missing elements within the agreement. Kissinger, as he often would, insisted on conducting many of the talks in secret while keeping more qualified negotiators out of the process. This eroded support for the agreement amongst those who would have otherwise would have been vocal advocates and further stoked those already against Kissinger and Détente. The main missing element which was a big missed opportunity was the omission of banning Multiple Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) (see footnote³). Overall despite this error when it comes to Kissinger’s performance as it relates to the Soviet Union, his efforts are credited with a significant, if temporary, improvement in reducing the acute tensions of the Cold War through diplomatic engagements and treaties. His tenure marked a shift towards more engagement and less direct confrontation, although many of the underlying rivalries and conflicts remained unresolved.

Not a war criminal yet, maybe some unfortunate similarities to Dr. Strangelove. Despite some hiccups with the way he conducted negotiations, he did de-escalate tensions with the USSR.

Watergate

The Nixon administration is likely best known for the infamous Watergate scandal. Watergate was one of the most consequential scandals of the 20th century, which led to Nixon’s resignation. Even before the events that led to Watergate, the Nixon administration was filled with secrecy and paranoia. This is important to remember, because this is the context in which Kissinger and his colleagues would operate from 1969-1974, when most of Kissinger’s diplomatic dealings would occur. 

This is not a Watergate article so all you need to know is that Kissinger emerged from the Watergate scandal unscathed, because: 

1. There was no evidence that he was involved or had knowledge of the Watergate scandal

2. The press wanted to protect him as he was seen as one of the bright spots within the administration

3. He was overseas, nowhere near Washington, conducting international dealings for most of the 2 year period of investigations and hearings (footnote part of this might have been by design)

As it relates to the Watergate scandal, what he can be accused of was helping foster the climate of distrust and wiretapping. Kissinger had ordered wiretaps on some of his own staff members during the early years of the administration. Largely to prove that they were not leaking information to the press. Ironically, he was doing more leaking than any of his staff and these wires ended up being used against him by political enemies looking to discredit him to the President or to predict his next moves.  

Not related to any accusations of him being a War Criminal. Wiretapping aides can be considered consistent with how an asshole would behave. Escaping the scandal with his reputation largely in-tact is a good signal for a diplomat. 

China

One of the achievements Kissinger is most credited for is opening US-Chinese relations. He paved the way for Nixon to go in 1972 representing the first trip by an active President to China. Relations between the two countries were characterized by hostility and isolation since the Chinese Communist Party's rise to power in 1949. Kissinger and Nixon’s visits culminated in the two countries agreeing to normalize relations, reducing their risk of confrontation. An added bonus was that this made the Soviets more willing to negotiate with the US. Prior to the Nixon administration, the dynamic was the two communist empires against the US. When Nixon & Kissinger were in power, the dynamic shifted to the two communist powers trying to both cozy up with the US. Nobody would have expected this in 1969. 

Kissinger had the vision and belief that there was an opportunity to work with China. He was surprised to learn that the relationship between the Soviets and Chinese was not as cooperative as experts had expected, and smartly took advantage of the situation. China also did apply pressure on North Vietnam to agree to a cease fire that would permit the survival of the South Vietnamese Thieu led government. As per Isaacson’s biography, those close to the situation believed that despite promising elements in place, had it not been for Kissinger, the normalization of relations between the US and China would not have come nearly as quickly as it did. 

Despite his accomplishments with China, his actions did not escape criticism. In typical Kissinger fashion, his secret dealings led to unnecessary confusion. Consistent with realpolitik, it also meant turning a blind eye to certain domestic repressions and human rights violations going on in China⁴. The way in which Kissinger handled the warming of relations between the US and China, did result in Taiwan losing its UN seat and Kissinger’s diplomatic vagueness, gave the Chinese the impression that the US would not oppose their view that Taiwan was part of China (this is still a problem today). Even after leaving office, Kissinger would continue to draw additional criticism as it relates to China. People believed he was too sympathetic to China, and ignored many Human Rights abuses including Tianammen square. Some speculate this had to do with business interests others because simply Kissinger is an a$$hole. 

Not a War Criminal, potentially an Asshole if you believe that the US has a moral obligation to try to ensure human rights abuses are not perpetuated. Opening up China was a momentous accomplishment for a Secretary of State.

Cambodia

Cambodia is the main reason why Kissinger’s critics consider him a war criminal. 

This will be tough to cover quickly without derailing the entire article or glossing over important details. Here is an attempt at a very simplified summary of the factors around when the US decided to conduct a ground invasion of Cambodia in 1970. 

• Cambodia, led by Prince Prince Norodom Sihanouk, was playing a very delicate balancing act of neutrality with the US & South Vietnamese, the North Vietnam, Chinese and others in the area.

• The North Vietnamese had set up bases inside Cambodia, from which to launch attacks on the South Vietnamese. Cambodia quietly allowed this.

• By 1969, American domestic support for the Vietnam war was eroded and Nixon’s administration was committed to withdrawing US soldiers. 

  • Kissinger, fearful of what an American defeat and Communist victory would mean in other parts of the world, was committed to keeping the South Vietnamese government in power. He was trying to negotiate a ceasefire that would allow for this. 

  • The North Vietnamese would not accept this and saw no reason to concede on this point, since they were winning militarily and knew they could simply wait for the US to withdraw their troops. Kissinger was trying to negotiate from a point of weakness. 

  • Kissinger was hoping that something would help the US efforts in Vietnam, to force the North Vietnamese to come to the bargaining table with meaningful concessions. 

• US Military personnel in Vietnam believed that attacking the North Vietnamese bases and secret headquarters inside Cambodia, would be of strategic importance. The US intelligence in Cambodia was not very good (they did not have a station chief for an extended stretch). On the insistence of the Military, who were very Hawkish, Nixon and Kissinger approved secret bombing operations inside Cambodia. 

  • They were secret, because congress and many other relevant parties were not informed. 

  • Similar to how the Cambodian government was okay with the North Vietnamese setting up headquarters and bases, they did not push back too hard against the bombings. 

  • These secret bombings went on for about a year, and did not really achieve the military or Kissinger’s objectives. On the other hand, it did not meaningfully destabilize Cambodia. 

  • About a year after the secret bombings had started, Prince Norodom Sihanouk, left the country and a coup ensued with his Prime Minister, Lol Nol assuming control (basically the whole government remained, they just swapped out the head). 

  • Lol Nol, was very outspoken in his support for the US. Nixon liked this.

  • The muted American response to the coup was perceived by Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Lol Nol, Cambodia and the North Vietnamese that they were supportive of the coup. (footnote: Kissinger disputed this, Prince Norodom Sihanouk did not believe him).  

(Kissinger and Le Duc Tho in 1972)

• Nixon was a drunk. Even when he was not inebriated, he was erratic. He saw a few too many screenings of the film Patton, reacted negatively to a few people calling him weak in Vietnam and decided he needed to show that he meant business (actually).

  • The military wanted to step up their efforts in Cambodia to go after a Secret North Vietnamese Communist hideout. Nixon wanted to show that he supported Col Nol. 

  • Nixon & The Military wanted to use US troops with air support. Kissinger did not want to use US troops. The State department wanted to do nothing footnote( at least for the time being as they accurately pointed out that this Secret North Vietnamese Communist hideout, is 1) a Secret and 2) Not in a fixed location, so how can they even know if the mission is successful.)

  • Nixon wanted to go ahead without even telling the Pentagon or State Department, let alone Congress. Kissinger at least convinced him to consult with the State and the Pentagon. Nonetheless, the secretive manner in which Nixon and Kissinger went about this operation, left many people in the dark and exacerbated matters when details would later be revealed. 

• The presumptive US support for Col Nol along with the ground invasion and bombing, led the North Vietnamese to embrace a small but violent communist group Khmer Rouge, then numbering only about 5,000. Within a few years, they numbered 70,000 and went on a genocidal massacre, killing up to 3 million Cambodians. 

• While the ground invasion and increased bombing of Cambodia was not Kissinger’s idea or even preference, he should have tried harder to convince Nixon against it, as he had successfully done in many other instances. Eventually he supported and later defended these actions, despite the lackluster military & diplomatic benefits. 

•  The charges of Kissinger being a war criminal are mostly centered around 

  1. Bombing Cambodia without officially declaring war or getting congressional approval

  2. Creating the situation that led to the rise of the Khmer Rouge leading to the millions that died at their hands. 

• The term War Criminal gets thrown a lot, normally people reserve it for the President not Secretary of State. Noam Chomsky makes a case for every president since Eisenhower up until Obama being guilty of war crimes. Link to video. 

  • Many of the critiques I read calling Kissinger a war criminal, generally take the Chomsky line.  

• Isaacson and Jeremy Suri (another biographer) do not believe he is a war criminal. Some of his adamant critics, Greg Grandin, accept Kissinger’s defense that in modern context, his actions in Cambodia would not be illegal today, and not that different from military actions by the Obama administration in Pakistan or Bush II during the War on Terror etc. His concerns were about the secrecy and illegality at the time

His actions in Cambodia make him a war criminal. When actually reflecting on what the charge of war criminal means, it might not be as damning as originally expected. Nonetheless, his treatment of Cambodia as a sideshow to Vietnam is a$$hole behavior. Not great diplomacy involved as it pertains to Cambodia.

Vietnam

When Kissinger and Nixon took office, the US involvement in Vietnam had been ongoing for over a decade, spanning three previous administrations. They knew that there was no more domestic support to fighting the war and that they needed to end it as soon as possible. The best way to accomplish this differed depending on if somebody was Dovish or Hawkish on Vietnam. The Dovish perspective was to withdraw as quickly as possible and in the best case, sign some peace agreement. The Hawkish perspective was to win the war outright. 

 The Doves in favor of withdrawal, generally held this position because they believed: 

1. The war was not winnable

2. Even if it was, it was no longer worth the many dead American soldiers and astronomical financial cost

3. US involvement in Vietnam was unjust, detrimental to American values and was hurting its international reputation. 

 The Hawks wanting to win the war believed: 

4. The war was winnable, if only they stuck with it, perhaps doubled down

5. A defeat in Vietnam would result in communist contagion across South East Asia (domino theory)

6. If the American’s abandoned South Vietnam, what credibility would they have with their allies in other conflicts?

Nixon had committed to withdraw troops but his administration was not ready to abandon the country. Kissinger had a pragmatic view on Vietnam. He agreed with the Doves in that the US direct military involvement would have to end, that they should train the South Vietnamese to be able to take on the North without American troops (Vietnamization). He also wanted a diplomatic resolution, resulting in a peace agreement that would keep the South Vietnamese government in power. 

Where he differed with the Doves, was that with his realpolitik worldview, a defeat in Vietnam would make America appear weak, which would hurt them in many other conflicts. His goal was to achieve a “Peace with Honor” meaning that the U.S. would exit the war in a way that preserved its credibility and avoided the appearance of a humiliating defeat. This involved negotiating a peace settlement that allowed for U.S. withdrawal while maintaining some stability in South Vietnam. To do so, the US still needed to appear strong in the eyes of the North Vietnamese, otherwise they would have no incentive to make concessions in negotiations. 

This pragmatic perspective made him appear Hawkish to Doves and Dovish to Hawks. 

Nixon and Kissinger, under pressure from Dovish members of their administration and Democrats in Congress, began withdrawing large amounts of troops. This hampered military options in the region, making it more difficult to negotiate a desirable settlement with the North Vietnamese. Nixon and Kissinger preferring to operate in secret, had Kissinger hold private negotiations with a North Vietnamese intermediary, Le Duc Tho. Kissinger was firm on needing the South Vietnamese government to remain in control, the North Vietnamese would not accept this. Negotiations between the two men would continue on and off for three years, until they finally reached a tentative agreement. Small problem was, with the negotiations being secret, many people, including South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu, did not agree with the deal Kissinger negotiated without his consultation. 

President Van Thieu strongly opposed the agreement, particularly provisions that allowed North Vietnamese troops to remain in the South and the lack of clear guarantees for South Vietnam's political future. Thieu's objections led to a delay in finalizing the agreement. Kissinger and Le Duc Tho engaged in further negotiations to address the concerns raised by the South Vietnamese government. Despite intense diplomatic efforts, the talks reached a stalemate. In typical Nixon fashion, he decided that the solution was to ramp up Military efforts on the North Vietnamese, hoping that the North Vietnamese would give in to the South Vietnamese demands. The US would go on a large bombing spree in late December, known as the Christmas Bombing, which Kissinger and other officials largely knew, was unlikely to garner the concessions that the South Vietnamese wanted. 

The North Vietnamese would come back to the negotiating table, but the final agreement did not look all that different from the previous one. Some semantic differences allowed both sides to see in the agreement what they had wanted. The end result was that a ceasefire was called, the US withdrew their troops, the South Vietnamese government could stay in place and all prisoners of war were released.  Kissinger and Le Duc Tho would win the Nobel Peace Prize, with much protest from many, including Le Duc Tho, Nobel Peace Prize committee officials. Their issue, rightfully so, was that they were winning an award for Peace that was not yet achieved. Kissinger accepted the reward but was ambivalent since he knew that the peace they achieved was only temporary.

(Kissinger receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in 1973)

They were all right to be ambivalent, since the peace did not last long after the US troops withdrew. Within a year both sides were ramping up for continued military efforts, which came almost 2 years after the withdrawal of the US troops, when the North Vietnamese launched a large-scale attack that led to the fall of the South Vietnamese government and the end of the Vietnam War. Many would blame Nixon, and Kissinger for the fall of Saigon. Kissinger wanted South Vietnam to survive but maintained that the lack of US domestic support for the war meant that giving the South Vietnamese a fighting chance, was the best they could have hoped for. 

Kissinger was largely criticized for Vietnam for a few main items. 

1. Conducting secret negotiations with Le Duc Tho and not including more people in the process. His behind-the-scenes diplomacy was seen as bypassing democratic processes and reducing accountability. This could have avoided the issues with Van Thieu and even the Christmas Bombing

2. Concessions made during the negotiations, such as allowing North Vietnamese troops to remain in the South, weakened the position of South Vietnam and undermined its long-term viability

3. The Paris Peace Accords, for which Kissinger received the Nobel Peace Prize, were criticized for not achieving a lasting peace. The agreement did not prevent the eventual collapse of South Vietnam and the reunification of the country under communist control. Critics saw it just as a way for the US to extricate itself away from Vietnam. 

4. By prolonging the war, Nixon and Kissinger created a high number of civilian casualties

Nixon & Kissinger could have attempted different negotiation tactics but the fact remained, they were trying to accomplish several conflicting goals simultaneously, therefore they were destined to fail. If they had immediately pulled out like the Doves wanted, the South Vietnamese definitely would have still fallen. It would have saved the lives of some American troops and reduced the number of civilian casualties they were responsible for but they would still be criticized by Hawks and the South Vietnamese for not giving them a fighting chance. Without the US flexing some military muscle, The North Vietnamese had no reason to make concessions. The North Vietnamese barely made any concessions after all the bombing, and fighting from the American’s, therefore it is unlikely that the Doves could have expected a better settlement without the use of force.  

The South Vietnamese definitely considered Kissinger a war criminal and an asshole. Hawks found him to be too weak, Doves too murderous. Kissinger, despite South Vietnam falling, did believe the agreement he negotiated gave at least temporary peace with honor. While aspects of the way that Kissinger and Nixon handled Vietnam could have been better, it is unclear if the end result would have changed. 

Yom Kippur War

After China, Kissinger gets the most praise for his handling of the Yom Kippur War and the subsequent diplomatic efforts that culminated in the Sinai Disengagement Agreements and paved the way for the Camp David Accords. In November of 1973, Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on Israel, the ensuing 14 day conflict would later be known as the Yom Kippur war. Nixon was distracted by Watergate, therefore Kissinger was left largely to his own devices to handle the conflict. Kissinger found himself in a delicate situation: 

• Israel requested supplies from Israel. 

• Some within the administration thought Israel should have been able to beat back them back without the help of the US. Therefore they did not want to provide the aid as it would have upset the Arab States and it would have hurt their credibility in the region.

• The USSR was backing Egypt and Kissinger did not want the conflict to turn into a setback for his Détente efforts. 

• The UN was pushing for an immediate ceasefire. 

  • If passed Egypt and Syria would have captured new land from the offensive. Kissinger knew Israel would not accept this and it would have invited future aggression 

•  A few days after the conflict started, there were concerns that if the US did not supply Israel, their survival was at risk

• Suddenly those that were previously reluctant were willing to supply Israel but there was disagreement about what should they supply, and if they should try to be stealth about it

This is when Kissinger decided to go for the Lone Ranger role. Analyzing the situation, he knew that Israel needed the supply, but if they moved too quickly and too aggressively, it would anger the other countries in the region. This would force the USSR to respond in kind. He then resorted to delay tactics to ensure the cease fire happened after Israel reclaimed their lost lands, but soon enough that they wouldn’t embarrass their adversaries. That the supplies would arrive, in time to ensure that Israel would not be at risk of losing, but that they couldn’t expand overly aggressively. 

(Kissinger and Anwar Sadat in 1974)

Miraculously, threading very tight needles everything worked out as he had hoped. The USSR did a minimal resupply of ammunition but did not escalate things. The US resupplied Israel in time, which did anger the Arab nations but a ceasefire was reached after Israel reacquired the lands taken by the Egyptian-Syrian offensive.  Kissinger successfully negotiated disengagement agreements between Israel and Egypt (January 1974) and between Israel and Syria (May 1974), leading to the withdrawal of forces and the establishment of buffer zones monitored by international peacekeepers.

Kissinger's efforts helped lay the groundwork for future peace negotiations and contributed to a period of relative stability in the region. His diplomacy improved U.S. relations with key Arab states, particularly Egypt, and paved the way for the later Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt in 1978. He accomplished this by flying between Egypt, Syria and Israel in what was coined “Shuttle Diplomacy”. Meeting with the respective heads of states, appealing to them directly pushing for a short term resolution as well as something longer lasting. There was certainly some duplicity and posterior polishing involved, but his handling of the situation has been largely praised. He also received criticism, for some by being too pro-Israeli, others for not being more helpful to Israel. Kissinger was adamant that in any situation, his role was to represent what was in the best interest of the United States, in this case it he was successful. 

Post-Office Years, Kissinger & Associates & Conclusion

Nixon resigned because of Watergate, his Vice President Gerald Ford assumed office. Ford’s personality differed greatly from Nixon, and the dynamic between him and Kissinger was much healthier. Kissinger continued to build on many of his previous initiatives, including Détente, China & Middle East Policy. Kissinger still faced significant opposition from various groups, including Democrats, Republicans, Activists, Academics and more. An area that even his critics would praise him for was his intellectual comfort in hearing differing perspectives. Even if Kissinger’s actions drew  such ire, his charm and desire to make friends with everyone, even his most ardent critics, did largely prove to be successful. This is not to say some of his actions such as Cambodia and others did not lose him friends, because it definitely did. His ability to maintain friendships with many groups would serve him later in life. Either way, when President Ford surprisingly lost the 1976 Presidential election to Jimmy Carter, this would spell the end to Kissinger’s time in public office.

Kissinger’s performance was largely well regarded, but despite his interest in serving further, he would never get the chance. He did not get along with Rumsfeld or Bush Sr. Raegan, not a fan of Détente, had always thought Kissinger was too soft on the USSR. Kissinger attempted to take more Hawkish positions in the press to appease this group but they still never gave him the chance (although many of his deputies from his time would instead). Kissinger instead found great success and enrichment through his international relations consulting firm Kissinger & Associates. Unlike many former officials, he chose to not use his influence or connections to lobby congress or the Senate. Instead offering his vast international network to open up doors for private sector companies looking to expand internationally. The consequences of this was that he amassed a sizable fortune but his independence would get called into question. He did not remain completely out of politics, as world leaders from many parties would regularly seek his counsel and he would opine in the media. 

Up until his death in November 2023, his legacy remained polarizing. Despite the premise of this article, it is not up to me to decide if he was a war criminal, asshole or a very effective secretary of state. Your perspective on Kissinger is a Rorschach test for your own world view. If you believe that moral considerations should be an important driver of international decision making, you will not like Kissinger. If you are a pragmatist that believes that maintaining power and stability can at times lead you to compromise on your morals, you might look at Kissinger’s performance more favorably.  Walter Isaacson did a great job summarizing Kissinger’s life, time in office and all the tactical & moral consequences surrounding Kissinger’s many diplomatic forays. I really enjoyed reading this and learnt a lot, if anything about this interests you, I would recommend checking it out as well. 

1. Kissinger will regularly mention one of the early things he associated with the United States was that he did not have to cross the street to avoid being beaten up

2. Perhaps most perplexing, including to the women he was dating, was that he was not even interested in them sexually. He purely just wanted to be seen out with them for photo appearances.

3. MIRVs are a cheap way to increase the firepower of a nuclear arsenal without building more rockets. The stability of the nuclear balance was undermined because MIRVs give the advantage to whomever attacks first (think attacker advantage in Risk). Many wanted this technology banned, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not. Kissinger was in favor of banning MIRVs but did not feel like he could convince the Joint Chiefs to accept the bans on MIRs and Anti-ballistics, and ended up choosing the latter. This omission prevented complete de-escalation, Kissinger would attempt to reinsert it in SALT II in 1979, but Gerald Ford lost the election and MIRVs would not be addressed until 1991. The issue with MIRVs cannot solely be blamed on Kissinger but this is an area that he concedes that he wishes had fully considered the implications of MIRV when negotiating the SALT I agreement and was a blemish on an otherwise groundbreaking diplomatic achievement.

4. Kissinger maintained that he did not believe that he or the US had the right to try to enforce Domestic policy decisions as part of international diplomacy. This runs in strong opposition to those who believe that the US has a moral responsibility to enforce their views on democracy & human rights worldwide